NASA orders more tests on Starliner, but says crew isn’t stranded in space

graylshaped

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After its tortured series of test flights, all of which rhymed with "QA/QC? What QA/QC?", any company's product would be making everyone nervous.

Off top of my head:
-Parachute not attached during pad abort test
-Wrong clock timer on first demo test, leading to circularization chaos
-Wrong thruster/orientation mapping during re-entry on first demo test
-Thruster failures throughout all three flights
-Completely stuck valve on attempt at uncrewed demo
-Wires wrapped in flammable tape necessitating a capsule rebuild (discovered somehow only weeks before a launch attempt)
-Helium leaks on this flight
-Thruster failures while approaching the station on this flight

You don't even need to go into Boeing's wide array of other quality crises to be nervous about Starliner, Starliner has earned the nerves all by itself.

Though in that list, I realize that their successful uncrewed demo doesn't make an appearance. Was it really flawless? That was my memory, I thought at the time "ok, they finally got it together".

Edit: No, it had thruster issues IIRC.
There is a reasonable case to be made that bringing the crew home safely via the Starliner crew module may allow Boeing a chance to survive as a company. Any other scenario just hastens a clock that is already ticking.
 
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All car brands have the same way to fuel up at a gas station. Gasoline pumps don't care what brand of car you are driving. Wearers of flight suits or space suits shouldn't have to worry about it if they can connect to an oxygen supply. No matter who the manufacturer is.
These aren’t mass produced items. Nor is settling on a single format always a win. These are experimental vehicles and there is still a lot more to learn about space and exploring it.

The massive ROI on space tech is by trying new things. Staying the same would have left us with just old space.
 
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Faanchou

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Not quite. Before you throw a die, if you know nothing about it or the way it is thrown, you assume that the die is fair and the throw is not a factor. You create a model, and the model tells you a probability. The probability is not a property of the event itself. If you had more information, however, you might be able to tell it with near certainty, save for quantum effects. Once you roll the dice, you know what you could have predicted, given enough information.
At what point does tossing an unfair die give you a 100% chance of getting the result you just got? Passing that, could you provide a meaning of the "100%" you used earlier that makes sense in at least some context?

Edited to add a link.
 
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Faanchou

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These aren’t mass produced items. Nor is settling on a single format always a win. These are experimental vehicles and there is still a lot more to learn about space and exploring it.

The massive ROI on space tech is by trying new things. Staying the same would have left us with just old space.
No, this is the final validation flight of one very particular item. How do you feel it's going and what are you learning from it?
 
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No, this is the final validation flight of one very particular item. How do you feel it's going and what are you learning from it?
Not what I’m saying. Having different setups for each of the vehicles is a plus.

That Boeing have screwed the pooch on this is becoming par for the course. However think of the reverse where Boeing used its lobbyists to make it their designs were the ones selected for all craft. Having standardization is great until it creates ossification of the industry.

As for have identical flight suits, that would assume identical seating or at least close enough that all the cabling would line up. That would be nice but then these suits are determined by the seats and other considerations like the toilet design.

At this point the question would be can a starliner flight suit fit in a Crew Dragon seat and would an adaptor work. Otherwise, what would it take to make a functional flight suit for two.
 
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You are entirely correct. So why, exactly, were these particular batteries only certified for 45 days to begin with? Does Boeing produce substandard batteries for such usage?
I mean… could be as simple as “certifying a given set of batteries takes more time/money the longer they’re certified for, it’ll be up there for like 15 days max, 3x buffer is good enough for this flight”?
 
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gelfling

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I assume detaching from the station is the riskiest part of this mission right now. I assume uneven thruster performance during undocking would be some within range of not good.
Its fine. They get a couple of astronauts out there for a space walk to give it a good shove away from the station, like push starting a car downhill.

The have a little instructional video narrated by the vault-tec mascot from Fallout explaining everything.
 
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adingo

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I posted in the previous thread that there's still a fairly benign hypothesis that jives with NASA/Boeing's behaviour: the vehicle is actually ok, and they have very good reasons to believe it so (but don't feel like sharing them?). Since the thrusters that shit the bed will be destroyed forever on re-entry, it makes a lot of sense to gather as much behaviour data as possible, so that maybe the issue is actually, finally fixed properly on Starliner's 4th try.

Of course, there's also the non-benign hypothesis of: the vehicle is not fine and they're not being candid. This is backed up by Boeing's past behaviour and the fact they keep scheduling these news releases for Friday afternoons.

And, of course, the worst possible hypothesis: the vehicle is bad but they think it's good.

In all 3 scenarios, keeping it attached as long as possible makes sense. You get more data, or you get a chance of a steely-eyed-missile-man setting SCE to AUX.
My guess is some mix of the above. They think the vehicle is ok, but they don't know for sure, can't prove it, and don't want to talk about their uncertainty. As to the underlying truth, my bet would be that the vehicle is in fact ok to return in. But I personally wouldn't return in it until I knew as much as Boeing does about the problems. Which makes me wonder what depth of communication there is with Butch and Suni about the issues.
 
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Even as a certification flight, there were tests to be run that would not happen during a nominal flight - for SpaceX and Boeing. During a nominal flight, the passengers would never touch the controls, but during the crew certification all the contingency systems (like manual control) were tested.

That's not to argue your main point that you're not supposed to have problems with basic subsystems like banks of thrusters on a crew certification flight.
I agree, and that's exactly my expectation for a certification flight. It's not supposed to be an example of a routine flight, but a demonstration that everything works to a particular standard--even the things that ideally will not be used during a routine flight.

Sure, a demonstration is technically a test, but it's to demonstrate that the product works as claimed for the benefit of the customer. The manufacturer should already have a high degree of justified confidence in their product if they're ready to demonstrate it to a customer. It's understandable for some issues to pop up during a demonstration, but serious issues should have been identified and fixed during the testing campaign. Boeing is scheduling their missions as if they were confident that their product is ready, but that confidence is clearly not justified.
 
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That'd make sense if we were talking about the next set of batteries, not the set already in space docked on the ISS.
Coming in at the tail end of this -- 45 days is what Boeing chisels into marble and lays at the feet of mission command, or is the minimum design spec. Boeing may think that it should work for five times as long, but they're willing to state with the nearest thing to certainty that it's 45 days. Now that they're in the situation they're designed to perform for, they're getting data back. If it exceeds what they and NASA have projected, they start saying, "Hey, we're getting more and more certain these are minimum 90 day batteries." This may be reflected in how future iterations of the same or similar design are rated.
There is a reasonable case to be made that bringing the crew home safely via the Starliner crew module may allow Boeing a chance to survive as a company. Any other scenario just hastens a clock that is already ticking.
Boeing has infinity government contracts. It has a multiyear backlog on airframes for commercial customers, even after the long list of oopsies. It will never be allowed to fully fail, as it's the only US airline manufacturer. If we ever had to go full MAEK PLANE NAO for reasons, we want the production line and basic expertise. LockMart alone won't cut it.
 
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Faanchou

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Coming in at the tail end of this -- 45 days is what Boeing chisels into marble and lays at the feet of mission command, or is the minimum design spec.
If NASA extends the mission to 60 days and the batteries end up going sideways, who takes the blame?
 
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If NASA extends the mission to 60 days and the batteries end up going sideways, who takes the blame?
This specific mission? NASA, if they choose to make a change. How is this a question? Boeing: "We told you those were 45 day rated batteries."
A future mission? If Boeing and NASA concur that everything points to the batteries having a rated on-station life of, say, 46 days, then now it's a 46 day battery. Battery didn't change, confidence in performance did.
 
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Mradyfist

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I don't understand how the tests performed resulted in the pattern of delays so far.

From the article, the thruster tests while docked to the station were completed on June 15th, which at the time was the rationale for delaying the return. That seemed totally reasonable, in light of the issues seen while docking - test the thrusters again in a safe scenario, prior to depending on them.

Now, two weeks later, another delay is announced because while the thrusters successfully fired during the docked test, the test itself wasn't valid for proving that the vehicle was safe to return on? Presumably, if the test didn't have clear success criteria, it shouldn't have been the only test used to clear Starliner for undocking, and unless there's some subtext here I missed, this was known before the test was performed.

If that's the case, why is the upcoming test on the ground just now being performed, instead of having been planned immediately after the docking issues? Or if it was planned, why hadn't it been made public knowledge until nearly a month after? Why does it take a month and a half to perform a ground-based test? That last question might have a perfectly valid answer, but it's certainly not being explained by Stich or Nappi.

Saying that NASA communications on this aren't "always timely, and often lack details and context" is a bit of an understatement. The gaps between them and missing information make them logically incoherent at times, which can lead the public to think that either NASA doesn't know what they're doing here, or they're being intentionally misleading.

It's worth remembering that this type of obsession with saving face in public was disastrous in the case of Columbia. It's hard not to read accounts of internal discussions around the viability of it as a return vehicle, and wonder if this is exactly what's happening right now.
 
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I don't understand how the tests performed resulted in the pattern of delays so far.

From the article, the thruster tests while docked to the station were completed on June 15th, which at the time was the rationale for delaying the return. That seemed totally reasonable, in light of the issues seen while docking - test the thrusters again in a safe scenario, prior to depending on them.

Now, two weeks later, another delay is announced because while the thrusters successfully fired during the docked test, the test itself wasn't valid for proving that the vehicle was safe to return on? Presumably, if the test didn't have clear success criteria, it shouldn't have been the only test used to clear Starliner for undocking, and unless there's some subtext here I missed, this was known before the test was performed.

If that's the case, why is the upcoming test on the ground just now being performed, instead of having been planned immediately after the docking issues? Or if it was planned, why hadn't it been made public knowledge until nearly a month after? Why does it take a month and a half to perform a ground-based test? That last question might have a perfectly valid answer, but it's certainly not being explained by Stich or Nappi.

Saying that NASA communications on this aren't "always timely, and often lack details and context" is a bit of an understatement. The gaps between them and missing information make them logically incoherent at times, which can lead the public to think that either NASA doesn't know what they're doing here, or they're being intentionally misleading.

It's worth remembering that this type of obsession with saving face in public was disastrous in the case of Columbia. It's hard not to read accounts of internal discussions around the viability of it as a return vehicle, and wonder if this is exactly what's happening right now.

Spot on. This is the kind of incoherence that comes from trying to CYA by minimizing the public exposure of a serious problem.

It sounds exactly like how NASA has handled the Orion heatshield issue - repeated assurances that it wasn't a big problem, while repeatedly pushing back deadlines. We still wouldn't know it was so serious if the inspector general hadn't posted photographs that NASA wasn't willing to share on their own.
 
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IShouldNotHaveSaidThat

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I don't understand how the tests performed resulted in the pattern of delays so far.
A bit of speculation here: all of the tests and all of the analysis count against the cost side of a fixed-price contract. I suspect that they are trying to be intelligent about their test plan. I favor more chaos in the testing, but I know that there are a lot of people that would not agree with that. Trying to be intelligent before you have enough data can make things look really strange.
 
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Spot on. This is the kind of incoherence that comes from trying to CYA by minimizing the public exposure of a serious problem.

It sounds exactly like how NASA has handled the Orion heatshield issue - repeated assurances that it wasn't a big problem, while repeatedly pushing back deadlines. We still wouldn't know it was so serious if the inspector general hadn't posted photographs that NASA wasn't willing to share on their own.
The entire government behaves like this, every department, every administration. (Please, present exceptions, I'm begging you.) Deflect, deflect, deflect. Present half information or fluff unless you're FOIA'd, and fight that to the hilt. Which, even when there's no there there, still creates its own problem. It's a culture of perpetual fear of blame. It's part of why the classification system is so broken -- what better place to stash your fuckups than behind a Classified or Secret stamp in a file cabinet no one ever sees?

Transparency builds confidence. If you're confident, be transparent. When you don't do that, you look like this.
 
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ranthog

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Yes, he has famously run SpaceX terribly. He has entered this incredibly easy-to-run industry and what has he accomplished? What possible evidence could anyone have that SpaceX has accomplished ridiculous things and been rock solid reliable in everything they do?
/s

You want to say that musk twitter ranting is abhorrent or self destructive, I am right with you. It forced him into buying twitter because he idiotically said something on Twitter and then they sued him to make him overpay for a failing site. The man needs to rest his thumbs.

But, to extend that to saying that SpaceX is equivalent to Boeing says more about your worldview than anything about musk or SpaceX.
You seem to have completely missed the point, given you're talking about his politics and twitter rambling. Two things that I never actually mentioned.

I have purely talked about his ability to run a company. After he bought twitter, he completely mismanaged to and turned it into a shell of what it was when he purchased it. But it was on track to be profitable again at the time he purchased it. As an engineer I can tell you he horrifically mismanaged the company and judged engineers based on the volume of code they wrote.

But maybe Twitter was a one off mistake by Musk. Maybe no one could have saved Twitter. So lets discount that.

How do you explain what is going on at Tesla right now? He did the equivalent of firing his entire rocket design team and the team who run the launch pads at Tesla, because he was miffed at two senior level executives. You also have Tesla's EV business declining at the same time everyone else's is growing.

You now have two companies with highly irrational business decisions taken by Musk that have severely damaged the companies. What is there stopping Musk from doing this to SpaceX?

In the end, I said both company's had a cancer in the C-suite. Boeing's is further along than with at SpaceX. But we've seen the effects of the one at SpaceX at both Twitter and Tesla. So yeah, if you're looking at this rationally, you got to be deeply worried about both providers at this time.
 
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ranthog

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You're reversing the burden of proof. This is a certification mission, to prove that Starliner is safe and reliable. Clearly it has failed to do so, and is therefore a failure.

That doesn't necessarily mean that Starline can't ever become a success. Maybe Boeing will at some point get their act together and be able to demonstrate that they have a safe and reliable craft.
How is the fact that we're not yet to the point where you can make that determination reversing the proof?

If we were at the point to know that, NASA would be announcing the astronauts returning on a different vehicle.
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I hate NASA PR speak so much:

“I want to make it very clear that Butch and Suni are not stranded in space," Stich said. "Our plan is to continue to return them on Starliner and return them home at the right time. We have a little bit more work to do to get there for the final return, but they're safe on (the) space station."

Being safe and being stranded are orthogonal concepts.


Then we have:

"Nappi said engineers are confident Starliner is safe to bring Wilmore and Williams home."

While we also have:

Bowersox said. “For the nominal entry, we want to look at the data more before we make the final call to put the crew aboard the vehicle, and it's a serious enough call that we’ll bring the senior management team together (for approval)."


So are the managers second-guessing the engineers? Or are the engineers not actually as sanguine about the safety of the return as Nappi conveyed?
Let's hope it's just "PR speak".

Normally in this space it's easier to spot imo.
 
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ranthog

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I think everyone with an engineering background would support the idea that extended testing of a problem is a good thing. There really is no safety concern for the two astronauts at the moment. And the part they're troubleshooting isn't coming home. All that is fine.

However, when NASA announces the two astronauts will be staying indefinitely in a blog post at 8:00 pm on a Friday one is allowed to think that perhaps there's more to the story than the straightforward troubleshooting that is claimed. PR spin that everything is fine and there's nothing to see here is also not helpful. A bit more honesty would go a long way like, "Obviously we had some anomalies on the flight up and we'd like to collect more information on that hardware before we send Butch and Suni home. They're in no danger and we're comfortable sending them home on Starliner when we're done investigating, but in the mean time we have a great opportunity to collect some data that will prove valuable for future Starliner flights." Had NASA and Boeing PR come out with that statement just a few days after arrival I don't think anyone would have batted an eyelash. But they way they're communicating has all the hallmarks of ass-covering not transparency.
It also isn't the first extension to this mission with a very similar rational that they want more time to investigate, and announced new round of on the ground tests they are doing with the system. This seems like a pretty damn rational thing to do if you're forcing Boeing to prove it is absolutely safe to complete the mission.
 
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ranthog

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“I want to make it very clear that Butch and Suni are not stranded in space (now, where did I put Elon's phone number?)"
The most obvious way to return them to earth besides Starliner doesn't involve calling anyone. It is just rearranging crew rotations. You send either of the other two operational vehicles up with two empty seats.
 
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Before the shuttle ever flew the USAF did their own independent technical assessment and estimated pLOV around 1 in 54.
Pretty damn accurate. Possibly even optimistic because of that one shuttle flight which would have been a disaster if the debris strike had been shifted maybe a foot.
 
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Damnit, Boing should no longer be allowed to produce so much as a can-opener, much less vehicles that carry human beings through the air and space. They simply are no longer capable of doing this kind of stuff.

How bad is Boing? Elon Musk is far better at this stuff than anyone at Boing. That says A LOT.
 
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Damnit, Boing should no longer be allowed to produce so much as a can-opener, much less vehicles that carry human beings through the air and space. They simply are no longer capable of doing this kind of stuff.

How bad is Boing? Elon Musk is far better at this stuff than anyone at Boing. That says A LOT.
Boeing is currently under investigation for making alloy-mixes with fake paperwork, so struts and important safety bars etc on aircraft could just buckle under stress, due to being diluted with aluminium/copper etc.

And this affects fucking AIRFORCE ONE! which had to be grounded for tests....Boeing could have killed the President. How the hell are they allowed to do ANYTHING for the US ever again?
 
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rschroev

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How is the fact that we're not yet to the point where you can make that determination reversing the proof?

If we were at the point to know that, NASA would be announcing the astronauts returning on a different vehicle.
.
There are two different things at play here, and we shouldn't mix them up.

First: Is the Starliner that is now docked to the ISS in good enough working order to return the astronauts home? That's unclear.

Second: Has Boeing demonstrated that Starliner in general is safe and reliable? Can we trust that the next missions conclude without major issues? I say no, regardless the rest of current mission. When 18% of the thrusters fail, there are no guarantees Boeing can manage the issue satisfactorily. Even if they now find the cause and a solution, they still need to demonstrate that that solution works in all phases of the mission.
 
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There is zero reason to rush to judgement of this mission until we see what the results of the mission are. So for now I'm watching it closely with interest. Like with all space missions, I want to see success.
Unlike the folks on Apollo 13. Yes they have time to spend but we've gotten so spolied with almost instant fixes that are gud nuf that we've forgoten that actual lives are at stake here. Of course, it doesn't help that Boeing is in the news almost every day for another screw up

"What are we doing today Brain?" "Screwup Boeing Again Pinky." Seems to be Boeing's Fate right now
 
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MMarsh

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Just gotta say: those numbers always freak me out.

I mean, not the particulars (1 in 100, 1 in 10,000) rather how the hell do you come up with that number and have any confidence whatsoever that you're even in the ballpark?

Also, that statement has very strong bad energy: that's pretty much exactly what I'd expect them to say if their astronauts were, in fact, stranded in space.

Hope they make it home safe.
Risk assessment is, by nature, hugely subjective. Quantifying it is difficult. As you work your way back along the failure chains, you always run into points where there's no solid statistical data.

And that's where human bias comes in.

You can have a standardized, thoroughly vetted, statistically valid process for all the math and logic that goes into calculating risks and failure probabilities for a complete system.

But the people who want the thing to be ready for the customer on time are always going to err one way in their estimates of the four million individual parameters that go into the modelling. The people whose job it is to enforce functional safety are always going to err the other way. And there might be three orders of magnitude difference between them – one says "our supplier's lifetime modelling program says that part XK-2275C is limited by ball screw fretting at 700,000 cycles" and the other says "yeah but there's a high FOD zone right beside XK-2275C and if coarse particulate gets stuck in the grease then XK-2275C might actually be limited by linear bearing wear after 700 cycles."

So they agree to put extra FOD control and cleaning checks in, but now nobody knows what the true MTBF of XK-2275C is in the actual as-built condition. Some will say it's now the 700,000 projected by the supplier for perfect conditions, while others will say it's closer to 7,000 and with a worryingly long tail because you're relying on difficult administrative controls.

Repeat for 3,999,995 more parts.
 
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All car brands have the same way to fuel up at a gas station. Gasoline pumps don't care what brand of car you are driving.
They do care whether your car runs on gasoline, diesel, CNG, hydrogen, propane - or some other fuel. They all have different connections. You can buy cars with any of those fuel types today - we don't even need to get into "Jay's Garage" with the Stanley Steamer, or the wood-gas conversions or LNG (I believe LNG has all been commercial vehicles.)
 
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That'd make sense if we were talking about the next set of batteries, not the set already in space docked on the ISS.
Apparently you are unaware that NASA traditionally sets mission/equipment timelines VERY conservatively. This has been going on for a very long time.

For example, Voyager 1 and 2 were 5 year missions to see Jupiter and Saturn. Then they added Uranus and Neptune, then kept on exploring - the "5 year" missions are approaching 50 years now.

In a more recent example, Spirit and Opportunity were 90 day missions. Spirit lasted ~20x that planned duration, Opportunity lasted nearly 60x that planned duration.

I'm not particularly concerned if NASA continues evaluating battery performance and concludes that the Starliner batteries can last longer (even much longer) than the original 45 day certification. NASA has a lot of experience with evaluating battery life in space.
 
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The valve fluttering on Atlas V is not Starliner and isn't actually a problem.
I suspect the reference was a couple of years older, when Starliner itself had 13 of 24 oxidizer valves misbehaving/sticking with the apparent root cause of "We forgot that our oxidizer penetrates Teflon and we forgot that it can get humid in Florida ".
 
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Risk assessment is, by nature, hugely subjective. Quantifying it is difficult. As you work your way back along the failure chains, you always run into points where there's no solid statistical data.

And that's where human bias comes in.

You can have a standardized, thoroughly vetted, statistically valid process for all the math and logic that goes into calculating risks and failure probabilities for a complete system.

But the people who want the thing to be ready for the customer on time are always going to err one way in their estimates of the four million individual parameters that go into the modelling. The people whose job it is to enforce functional safety are always going to err the other way. And there might be three orders of magnitude difference between them – one says "our supplier's lifetime modelling program says that part XK-2275C is limited by ball screw fretting at 700,000 cycles" and the other says "yeah but there's a high FOD zone right beside XK-2275C and if coarse particulate gets stuck in the grease then XK-2275C might actually be limited by linear bearing wear after 700 cycles."

So they agree to put extra FOD control and cleaning checks in, but now nobody knows what the true MTBF of XK-2275C is in the actual as-built condition. Some will say it's now the 700,000 projected by the supplier for perfect conditions, while others will say it's closer to 7,000 and with a worryingly long tail because you're relying on difficult administrative controls.

Repeat for 3,999,995 more parts.
Nice characterization.

Having participated in such a risk management program for about 40% of my career, what mostly saves you is the number of eyes of the different disciplines against the risk register. My experience is most of the participants are well-meaning, but their individual perspectives and biases can get in the way of sorting through those statistical ambiguities. And the folk I tend to worry about more are those closest to the problem - they can be too close to the problem "to see the forest", so to speak.

It still all boils down to statistical characterization of non-zero probabilities, and so the fundamental endeavor is to keep the decision makers continually aware of the implications of that. That becomes really hard when you put "1 in 100,00" probability criteria in the likelihood part, it's still not Zero...
 
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